Updated September 11, 2026
Prime Minister Mark Carney said during the 2025 federal election campaign that his government did not intend to repeal Bill C-69.
He has technically kept that promise.
Bill C-69's most consequential surviving legislation—the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act—remains Canadian law.
But something politically and economically significant has now happened.
Carney's government has removed major interprovincial and international pipelines from the Impact Assessment Act's designated-project process.
That means pipelines regulated by the Canada Energy Regulator will ordinarily no longer go through the separate Impact Assessment Act process that Bill C-69 established.
Instead, the Canada Energy Regulator can conduct the federal review—or, for projects Ottawa considers nationally important, Cabinet can use the newer Building Canada Act process.
So did Carney repeal Bill C-69?
No.
Did his government significantly roll back the Trudeau-era federal pipeline-review structure?
Yes.
And that distinction becomes particularly important because Ottawa is simultaneously advancing a proposed new pipeline capable of carrying approximately one million barrels of oil per day from Alberta toward Canada's Pacific coast.
What Exactly Changed on September 3, 2026?
The most important development is SOR/2026-185, formally called the Regulations Amending the Physical Activities Regulations.
The regulation was registered—and therefore came into force—on September 3, 2026. It was subsequently published in the Canada Gazette on September 9.
The federal Cabinet made the regulation on the recommendation of the environment minister.
The government's stated objective is straightforward:
stop requiring certain projects to go through overlapping federal regulatory processes.
Among the projects removed from the Impact Assessment Act's Project List are:
- International and interprovincial pipelines
- International and interprovincial electrical transmission lines
- Certain offshore renewable-energy projects regulated by the CER
- Certain oil and gas pipelines and facilities regulated by the CER
- Certain in-situ oil-sands projects
- Certain fossil-fuel power-generating facilities
The government says projects already regulated under the Canadian Energy Regulator Act should generally be assessed by a single federal regulator rather than simultaneously falling under the CER and Impact Assessment Agency processes.
So Is This a Rollback of Bill C-69?
For pipelines, yes—but it is a targeted rollback rather than repeal of the legislation.
Bill C-69 became law in 2019 under former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
It replaced the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 with the Impact Assessment Act and replaced the National Energy Board with the Canada Energy Regulator.
The legislation expanded the federal impact-assessment framework beyond traditional environmental effects to consider broader environmental, economic, health and social factors.
Critics—including Alberta governments, energy companies and construction organizations—argued that the system created excessive uncertainty and discouraged investment.
Supporters argued that major projects needed comprehensive environmental, Indigenous, health and socioeconomic assessment before approval.
The Supreme Court Already Forced Trudeau's Government to Change the Law
There is another part of this history that shouldn't be overlooked.
In October 2023, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that much of the original federal designated-project assessment scheme was unconstitutional because it extended beyond Parliament's constitutional authority.
The Court did not say the federal government had no authority to conduct environmental assessments.
Instead, the majority found that the designated-project scheme was overly broad and insufficiently anchored to effects within federal jurisdiction.
Trudeau's government responded by amending the Impact Assessment Act in June 2024.
Those amendments narrowed federal decision-making toward adverse effects that fall within clear federal constitutional jurisdiction and created greater opportunities to cooperate with provincial assessment processes.
Carney's 2026 changes therefore didn't occur in isolation.
They represent another stage in a regulatory framework that had already been substantially altered following the Supreme Court decision.
Carney Explicitly Said He Wouldn't Repeal Bill C-69
During the 2025 election campaign, Carney was directly asked how he could keep Bill C-69 while promising to build major infrastructure.
His answer was unusually clear:
“We do not plan to repeal Bill C-69.”
He instead argued that Canada should remove duplication through a “one project, one approval” approach.
That distinction now looks important.
Carney did not repeal the legislation.
Instead, his government has increasingly changed which projects are captured by it and created alternative approval mechanisms for nationally important projects.
The Most Accurate Description of What Carney Has Done
Calling this a complete repeal of Bill C-69 would therefore be inaccurate.
Calling it meaningless would also be inaccurate.
A better description is:
Carney has kept the Impact Assessment Act while removing pipelines from one of its most consequential review mechanisms and creating a separate fast-track process for projects his Cabinet considers nationally important.
That's a meaningful change in Canadian energy policy.
Does This Mean Pipelines No Longer Receive Environmental Reviews?
No.
This is an important distinction because removing pipelines from the Impact Assessment Act does not mean environmental considerations disappear.
The Canada Energy Regulator remains responsible for reviewing federally regulated pipelines.
Under the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, the regulator considers factors including:
- Environmental effects
- Health effects
- Social effects
- Economic effects
- Cumulative environmental effects
- Indigenous rights and interests
- Safety and security
- Canada's climate commitments
- Alternative means of carrying out a project
- Public-interest considerations
The federal government's argument is that requiring an additional Impact Assessment Agency process creates duplication because the CER already examines many of the same issues.
Environmental Critics Have a Different Concern
Critics aren't necessarily arguing that absolutely no environmental analysis will occur.
The more substantive criticism is that Canada has removed an additional federal impact-assessment layer that was institutionally separate from the energy regulator.
That potentially means:
- Fewer procedural stages
- Greater reliance on the CER
- Less institutional separation between economic regulation and environmental assessment
- Potentially different opportunities for public participation
- A narrower federal review structure
So the argument is not really:
environmental assessment versus no environmental assessment.
It is:
how extensive should federal environmental assessment be, and how many separate federal institutions should participate?
Ottawa's Own Filing Contains a Fascinating Detail
The government's regulatory-impact statement says that since the Impact Assessment Act system began in 2019, no pipeline has completed an integrated IAA/CER panel assessment.
The government also says only one qualifying pipeline is anticipated over the next decade.
Ottawa doesn't identify that pipeline in the regulation.
But the timing makes an obvious question worth asking:
Is the proposed West Coast Oil Pipeline the project Ottawa expects?
That is a reasonable inference given current federal policy, but it remains an inference rather than an explicit government admission.
What Is Canada's Proposed West Coast Oil Pipeline?
The proposed West Coast Oil Pipeline is a massive new energy project currently being advanced by the Government of Alberta.
The federal Major Projects Office currently describes the proposal as approximately:
- 1,250 kilometres of new pipeline
- One million barrels per day of capacity
- Originating in the Bruderheim/Edmonton region
- Travelling toward southern British Columbia
- Approximately 11 pump stations
- A new marine terminal
- A corridor expected to largely follow the existing Trans Mountain route
The exact route has not been finalized.
And this point is essential:
The pipeline has not yet received final construction approval.
The Pipeline Is Still in the Early Development Stage
As of September 11, 2026, the federal Major Projects Office describes the pipeline as being in the early stages of development.
Alberta is currently the formal project proponent.
The process so far looks like this:
- Alberta developed and submitted the proposal.
- Ottawa referred the project to the Major Projects Office on July 2, 2026.
- The MPO began Indigenous, provincial and federal consultations.
- Ottawa published notice on August 1 that Cabinet may list the pipeline as a project of national interest.
- Cabinet is expected to decide whether to list it by October 1, 2026.
- If listed, Ottawa intends to work toward a binding conditions document by September 1, 2027.
Referral to the Major Projects Office is therefore not the same thing as construction approval.
The Building Canada Act Changes the Meaning of Approval
This is arguably the most important part of Carney's new regulatory system.
The Building Canada Act received Royal Assent in June 2026 as part of the One Canadian Economy Act.
It allows Cabinet to identify projects considered to be in Canada's national interest.
The government can consider whether a project:
- Strengthens Canada's autonomy and security
- Provides substantial economic benefits
- Has a high probability of successful execution
- Advances Indigenous interests
- Contributes to clean growth and climate objectives
Once Cabinet lists a project under the Building Canada Act, something extremely important happens.
The federal process effectively moves from asking:
“Should this project proceed?”
to:
“Under what conditions should this already nationally approved project proceed?”
The federal government's own explanation uses essentially this distinction.
Cabinet Therefore Gains Enormous Power
This addresses an important concern about Carney's approach.
His government isn't simply transferring final authority from politicians to an independent regulator.
For projects proceeding through the Building Canada Act, the process becomes explicitly political at the beginning.
The federal Cabinet decides whether the project is nationally important.
Once listed, federal approvals covered by the legislation are granted upfront, subject to consultation and the conditions subsequently established through the consolidated review.
The Minister of One Canadian Economy ultimately issues the conditions document.
The CER and other regulators remain important for:
- Technical analysis
- Safety
- Security
- Environmental conditions
- Consultation
- Regulatory expertise
But the fundamental national-interest decision belongs to Ottawa.
So Has Carney Reduced Regulation—or Centralized It?
The answer is arguably:
both.
He has reduced procedural duplication.
But for nationally important projects, he has also concentrated considerable authority in Cabinet and the responsible federal minister.
That creates an interesting trade-off.
Investors may receive faster decisions and greater certainty.
But the initial determination of whether a project should proceed becomes more explicitly political.
The Proposed Pipeline Has an Unusual Ownership Structure
The proposed construction-stage ownership currently described by Ottawa is:
| Participant | Proposed Interest |
|---|---|
| Pembina Pipeline | 10% |
| Trans Mountain Corporation — federally owned | 45% |
| Alberta Petroleum Marketing Commission | 45% |
Pembina may have the opportunity to increase its interest after commercial operation, while Indigenous communities are expected to receive opportunities to acquire equity from government interests.
This means that during construction the proposal, as currently structured, would be approximately 90% owned through federal and Alberta government entities.
That's an important economic consideration.
This is not currently structured as a conventional privately financed pipeline in which private investors alone decide that the expected return justifies construction risk.
Why Would Governments Take So Much Initial Ownership?
There are several possible explanations.
The governments may believe the project has strategic national value extending beyond the private financial return.
They may also believe government participation reduces financing risk and helps the project reach construction.
But it creates another legitimate question:
If this pipeline is economically compelling at one million barrels per day, how much private capital would be willing to build it without government ownership?
The answer will become clearer as commercial arrangements, shipping commitments and financing details emerge.
The Pipeline Is Connected to Carbon Capture
Another unusual feature is that Ottawa and Alberta have explicitly linked construction of the West Coast pipeline to the Pathways carbon capture project.
The May 2026 Canada-Alberta Implementation Agreement says construction of the two projects is mutually dependent.
Pathways is intended to become an enormous carbon-capture, utilization and storage system serving Alberta's oil sands.
The governments are targeting approximately 16 million tonnes of annual emissions reductions.
That means Carney's pipeline policy isn't simply:
produce and export more oil.
It is closer to:
increase Canadian oil-export capacity while simultaneously requiring a massive carbon-management project.
That Could Become One of the Pipeline's Biggest Risks
Linking the projects may make the pipeline more politically acceptable to governments committed to Canada's net-zero objectives.
But it also creates dependency.
If Pathways encounters:
- Cost overruns
- Financing problems
- Technology difficulties
- Regulatory delays
- Disputes over government support
- Disagreements over carbon-credit values
- Changes to industrial carbon-pricing policy
- Delays securing sufficient private investment
then the pipeline could potentially be affected as well.
That creates what investors would call execution risk.
Instead of evaluating one enormous infrastructure project, investors and governments effectively have to consider the successful execution of two interconnected megaprojects.
That doesn't mean either project will fail.
But tying them together creates another condition that must be satisfied before the overall strategy works as intended.
Carbon Pricing Creates Another Complication
The Pathways connection also brings Canada's industrial carbon-pricing system directly into the pipeline story.
Canada eliminated the federal consumer fuel charge effective April 1, 2025, but it did not eliminate industrial carbon pricing.
The Carney government has retained industrial carbon pricing while revising the previously planned price trajectory.
The current federal benchmark trajectory begins at $95 per tonne of CO2 equivalent in 2026, rises to $100 in 2027, remains at that level through 2029, reaches $115 in 2030 and rises more gradually thereafter.
This is substantially below the previous Trudeau-era trajectory that had been scheduled to reach $170 per tonne by 2030.
That distinction matters.
Carney has therefore simultaneously:
- Eliminated the consumer carbon price
- Reduced the previously scheduled industrial carbon-price trajectory
- Retained industrial carbon pricing as a long-term policy
- Linked a major new oil-export pipeline to carbon capture
This is not the abandonment of Trudeau-era climate policy.
It is a significant restructuring of it.
The Economics of Pathways May Depend Partly on Government Policy
Carbon capture presents an unusual investment problem.
An ordinary pipeline transports a commodity that has a market value.
Oil can be sold.
Natural gas can be sold.
Electricity can be sold.
Captured carbon dioxide generally doesn't have comparable market value sufficient by itself to finance a project of the scale contemplated by Pathways.
The economic value of capturing carbon can therefore depend substantially on government-created incentives, including:
- Industrial carbon prices
- Carbon credits
- Investment tax credits
- Government funding
- Regulatory requirements
- Contracts designed to provide certainty over future carbon values
That doesn't automatically make carbon capture uneconomic or undesirable.
But it means the investment case can be unusually dependent on future government policy.
That Creates Political Risk in Both Directions
An oil producer can worry that a future government will make carbon compliance more expensive.
A carbon-capture investor can have the opposite concern:
What happens if a future government reduces the carbon price or eliminates the incentive that made the project financially attractive?
Both businesses therefore have to price political decisions into investments expected to operate for decades.
This becomes particularly important when the pipeline itself is formally dependent on completion of the carbon-capture project.
British Columbia Has Not Endorsed the Pipeline
Another major risk is British Columbia.
The Canada-British Columbia Cooperative Prosperity Agreement does not say B.C. wants the project.
In fact, it explicitly states that British Columbia “does not seek this project.”
B.C. nevertheless recognizes federal constitutional jurisdiction over interprovincial pipelines and has agreed to participate in discussions involving routing, permitting and related matters.
The agreement also preserves several important provincial interests.
Among them:
- The federal North Coast tanker moratorium remains in place
- Indigenous consultation must occur
- Environmental protections remain relevant
- Canada and B.C. must negotiate financial arrangements
- An environmental-liability framework must be established
So the pipeline currently has federal political support without equivalent enthusiasm from the province through which its western portion and marine-export infrastructure would have to operate.
The Route Is Another Major Unknown
The proposed corridor is expected to follow much of the existing Trans Mountain route, but the final alignment has not been determined.
That matters because a pipeline route determines:
- Which Indigenous territories are affected
- Which private lands are crossed
- Which environmentally sensitive areas are encountered
- Construction difficulty
- Engineering requirements
- Costs
- Municipal involvement
- Potential litigation
A 1,250-kilometre conceptual pipeline and a fully engineered 1,250-kilometre pipeline are very different things.
Until detailed routing and engineering are completed, the final construction cost remains inherently uncertain.
Trans Mountain Provides an Important Warning About Cost Estimates
Canada already has recent experience with an enormous Alberta-to-Pacific pipeline project.
The Trans Mountain Expansion eventually entered commercial service, dramatically increasing Canada's capacity to export oil through the Pacific coast.
But its cost increased enormously during development and construction.
The project's experience demonstrates why early pipeline estimates should be treated cautiously.
Routing changes, regulatory requirements, environmental mitigation, construction conditions, inflation, financing costs, labour availability and delays can all materially alter the final price of a megaproject.
The West Coast proposal does not yet have a final public construction-cost estimate on the Major Projects Office project record.
That means Canadians currently cannot determine the project's expected return on invested capital with the precision they eventually should demand—particularly given the proposed government ownership.
Who Ultimately Bears the Financial Risk?
This question becomes especially important because approximately 90% of the proposed construction-stage ownership would initially sit with federal and Alberta government entities.
If construction proceeds on budget and the pipeline attracts sufficient long-term shipping commitments, government equity could potentially become valuable.
If construction costs substantially exceed expectations, however, taxpayers could ultimately bear more risk than they would under an entirely privately financed project.
Government ownership therefore changes the policy question.
It is no longer simply:
“Should Ottawa allow a private company to build this pipeline?”
It also becomes:
“Should Canadian governments put substantial public capital at risk to make the pipeline happen?”
Commercial Demand May Be the Most Important Test
A one-million-barrel-per-day pipeline requires enormous and durable demand from shippers.
The strongest evidence that the project is economically compelling would therefore be major oil producers voluntarily signing long-term transportation commitments and private investors putting substantial capital at risk.
Government declarations can establish strategic importance.
They cannot manufacture profitable long-term shipping demand.
If producers are willing to enter substantial long-term contracts at tolls capable of financing construction and operation, that would materially strengthen the commercial case.
If government must assume most of the construction risk because private investors remain unwilling to do so, Canadians should ask why.
Indigenous Consultation Is Not a Formality
The pipeline would cross territories associated with numerous Indigenous communities.
Ottawa has indicated that Indigenous groups may eventually be offered equity ownership.
That could potentially create substantial long-term economic participation if the project succeeds.
But offering ownership does not eliminate the Crown's constitutional duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate Indigenous peoples whose rights may be affected.
Different communities may also reach different conclusions about the project.
Some may view pipeline ownership as an opportunity to create long-term revenue, employment and economic independence.
Others may oppose particular routes or environmental risks regardless of the financial opportunity.
That makes consultation another genuine project-development requirement rather than something Ottawa can simply declare completed through a national-interest announcement.
Could Court Challenges Still Delay the Pipeline?
Yes.
The Building Canada Act is designed to accelerate federal approvals, but legislation cannot eliminate constitutional review by Canadian courts.
Potential litigation could involve issues such as:
- Indigenous consultation
- Aboriginal and treaty rights
- Federal-provincial jurisdiction
- Administrative-law challenges
- Environmental conditions
- The interpretation or application of the Building Canada Act itself
Whether any particular challenge would succeed is impossible to predict before the final route, conditions and consultation record exist.
But litigation risk remains part of the project's timeline.
The Pipeline Therefore Has Several Independent Failure Points
As of September 11, 2026, the project still depends on several major pieces falling into place:
- Cabinet listing the project as being in the national interest
- A commercially and technically viable final route
- Successful Indigenous consultation and accommodation
- Acceptable arrangements with British Columbia
- A workable environmental-liability framework
- Competitive construction costs
- Sufficient long-term shipping commitments
- Financing
- Successful development of the linked Pathways carbon-capture project
- Resolution of regulatory and carbon-policy details
- Surviving potential litigation
- Final conditions that still leave the project economically viable
That's why describing the West Coast Oil Pipeline as “approved” today goes too far.
Ottawa has created a much easier legal pathway through which it could approve and advance the project.
It has not yet demonstrated that all of the commercial, constitutional, engineering and financial conditions necessary to build it have been satisfied.
October 1, 2026 Is the Next Major Test
The next significant milestone is Cabinet's expected decision by October 1, 2026 on whether to list the West Coast Oil Pipeline as a project of national interest under the Building Canada Act.
If Cabinet declines to list it, the political significance would be obvious.
If Cabinet lists it, the significance is equally important.
Listing would mean Ottawa has moved beyond merely studying a proposal and has made the fundamental federal determination that the project should proceed, subject to the conditions subsequently established.
That still wouldn't mean excavators immediately begin digging a 1,250-kilometre trench.
But it would represent a much more consequential commitment than referral to the Major Projects Office.
The Larger Question Is Whether Carney Has Actually Changed Canada's Investment Environment
This may ultimately matter more than one pipeline.
Canada's problem during the past decade has not simply been whether individual projects could technically receive approval.
Investors also care about:
- How long approval takes
- Whether the rules remain stable
- Whether governments change requirements after capital has been committed
- Whether projects survive political changes
- Whether infrastructure can actually be constructed at competitive cost
Carney's reforms attempt to answer some of those concerns through shorter processes, reduced duplication and Cabinet-level national-interest decisions.
But centralizing political authority creates its own question:
Has Canada created a genuinely more predictable investment system—or simply a faster system for projects favoured by the government of the day?
The West Coast Oil Pipeline may become the first major test of that distinction.